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WAS THERE A BABY IN THE BATHWATER?
A COMMENT ON THE SUPREME
COURT'S LEGISLATIVE VETO
DECISION*
PETER L. STRAUSS**
Examining the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the legislative
veto case, Professor Strauss stresses the importance of a distinction no
Justice observed between use of the veto in matters affecting direct, con-
tinuing, political, executive-congressional relations, and use of the veto
in a regulatory context. Only the latter, he argues, had to be reached by
the Court; and only the latter presents the constitutional difflculties that
troubled the Court. The utility of the veto in the political context makes
the opinions' sweep regrettable-
The Supreme Court's decisions in the legislative veto cases' at-
tracted headlines and public commentary rarely experienced by the
Court. Written following what was evidently a difficult internal pro-
cess,2 the Chief Justice's majority opinion in the principal case, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,3 seems intended to sweep
all of the 200-plus legislative veto provisions from the statute books, in
addition to the one provision necessarily before the Court in the case.
That impression is confirmed by subsequent summary actions affirming
unanimous opinions of the District of Columbia Circuit striking down
legislative vetoes affecting regulatory agency rulemaking,4 as well as by
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1. The principal decision, in which the Court wrote at length, was Immigration and Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. CL 2764 (1983). At the end of its term, the Court also summarily
decided two cases involving legislative vetoes of rules adopted by regulatory agencies. See Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. CL 3556 (1983), a f'g
Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States
Senate v. FTC, 103 S. CL 3556 (1983), aeg Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (en banc).
2. The Chadha case was first argued in the October 1981 term of Court, and then set for
reargument during the last term. Reargument is ordered rarely; in this case, two dissents from the
reargument order on the ground that the Court was ready to decide the case suggest a high level of
dispute. See 102 S. Ct. at 3507 (1982) (Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
3. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
4. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556
(1983), aeg Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
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the disapproval evident in three separate opinions in Chadha.5 The
immediate and pained response of Congress 6 suggested as well the un-
derstanding that it had been deprived, in all contexts, of a valued legis-
lative tool.
This comment looks closely at the opinions in the Chadha case, so
far as they concerned the legislative veto issues, to assess their reason-
ing and the warrant for so embracive an approach. It concludes that
both opinions suggesting an overall approach to the issues, the majority
opinion and Justice White's dissent, fail in their analysis by approach-
ing the legislative veto as if the issues it presented were always the
same, and as if Congress were far more limited in its function and in its
relationship with those who execute the nation's laws than in fact it is.
Legislative vetoes have been used in a variety of settings, though
perhaps less universally than the press excitement over the Chadha de-
cision would lead one to believe.7 According to figures supplied by the
Congressional Research Service, Congress had exercised a total of 230
legislative vetoes between 1930 and 1982: 111 of these terminated pro-
posed suspensions of deportation for 229 individual aliens under the
immigration and naturalization laws (the remainder of the 5701 sus-
pensions proposed took effect); 65 were exercised under the Budget
United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), afg Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575
(D.C. Cit. 1982) (en banc).
5. Justice Powell, concurring on a rationale specific to the case, and Justices White and
Rehnquist in dissent, underscored the breadth already apparent in the majority opinion by the
attention they gave it. See 103 S. Ct. at 2788-92 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting); 103 S. Ct. at 2792-
2816 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); 103 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. Shortly after the decision, the House overwhelmingly adopted a bill that would replace
the requirement that rules adopted by the Consumer Product Safety Commission be subject to the
possibility of a legislative veto with alternative equivalents: that no rule would become effective
until enacted by Congress in statutory form (thus essentially depriving the Commission entirely of
its rulemaking authority); and that proposed rules could not take effect for a prolonged period (90
"legislative days") during which Congress can enact a statute of disapproval. See 129 CONG. REC.
H4758-84 (daily ed. June 29, 1983) (proceedings related to H.R. 2668, 98th Cong., 1st Sess,
(1983)). Of course only one of these measures can be expected to appear in any ultimate statute.
The effect of the vote was to underscore what might have been expected, and was indeed recog-
nized in the majority opinion, namely that Congress would insist on strong continuing oversight of
regulatory rulemaking, whether or not the legislative veto remained an available option for
achieving that end. Midsummer hearings in both the Senate and the House were characterized by
statements of resolution, at least on the part of the participating congressmen, that the close over-
sight of executive branch activity suggested by the veto will continue; and acceptance by executive
branch spokesmen that it properly would continue. See, e.g., Congress Digs in After Legislative
Veto, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1983, at E4, coL 3.
7. Although the approximately 200 current legislative veto provisions attest Congress' recent
regard for the technique, they affect only a small proportion of the authority Congress has dele-
gated to government agencies. Legislative proposals on the brink of enactment during the past
few Congresses would have extended the veto to all agency rulemaking, and were widely and
accurately regarded as portending a major expansion in use of the device.
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Control and Impoundment Act, disapproving a minute proportion of
the alterations regularly made by the President in the budget and ap-
propriations legislation Congress enacts yearly; 24 disapproved a few of
the many reorganizations the President proposed in the internal organi-
zation of the federal government. Of the 30 remaining legislative ve-
toes exercised, some concerned foreign relations, international
commerce or defense, issues also dominated by presidential initiative
and high political interest; only the remainder dealt with the regulatory
matters that may have loomed most important in the Court's
consideration.8
Faced with uses of the legislative veto that allowed the President
and Congress to resolve directly constitutional and policy differences
on issues of high political and small legal moment, uses that accommo-
date a necessarily continuing dialogue between Congress and the Presi-
dent on matters internal to government (its budget and structure), uses
for deciding questions of individual status such as deportability, and
uses for oversight of agency conduct such as public rulemaking directly
affecting obligations of the public, the Court might have been expected
to distinguish among these uses or, at least, to decide in a way that
reserved consideration of those uses not presented in Chadha. The
Court did not do so; the argument of this essay is that the Court's ac-
tions would have been far more acceptable, reaching precisely the same
result in the matters before it, had it attended to the multiplicity of
settings in which the veto has been used.
Such an argument may seem like just another assertion of the law
professor's preference for neatness and modesty in judicial action or,
worse yet, an arid exercise of 20-20 hindsight, unaccommodating to the
political realities of reaching decision on a pressured, busy Court. I
believe there is more. The importance of measures like the reorganiza-
tion acts does not lie in whether Congress should reserve a veto, how-•
ever infrequently such a veto is exercised, but in whether, in the
absence of the veto power, Congress would permit such an efficient
mechanism for the President's construction of lines of coordination and
control for those whose performance of duty he is constitutionally
obliged to oversee, rather than insist on the use of ordinary legislative
processes. Seen in this light, the use of legislative veto provisions may
empower the President as much as Congress. Use of the veto as an
instrument of the continuing political dialogue between President and
Congress, on matters having high and legitimate political interest to
8. Smith & Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A. J. 1258, 1258
(1983).
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both, and calling for flexibility for government generally, does not pres-
ent the same problems as its use to control, in random and arbitrary
fashion, those matters customarily regarded as the domain of adminis-
trative law. That none of the disputants before the Court may have
found it in their interest to argue for such distinctions and that the
Court itself did not suggest them, only, illustrates once more the
problems presented by the Court's limited capacity to entertain and
decide issues of national importance, and the resulting temptation to
make doctrine governing the future, rather than decision of the pend-
ing case the centerpiece of the Court's effort.
I. THE SETTING
Jagdish Chadha is an East Indian. Brought up in Kenya, but re-
taining his British Commonwealth passport, he came to the United
States on a student visa, and then stayed beyond its expiration. For
that reason he was deportable, but Kenya would not receive him back
(he having declined an opportunity to elect Kenyan citizenship) and
other Indians of Kenyan birth holding Commonwealth passports had
encountered difficulty in being admitted to Great Britain. An immigra-
tion judge of the Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service-a civil servant strongly protected against political
interference in his judgment 9-found that these -and other factors es-
tablished Mr. Chadha's claim to a compassionate suspension of depor-
tation under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.10
That section defines the factors that must be present to support such a
9. Although neither statutory administrative law judges nor judges are bound (in terms) by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, §§ 701-706 (1976), cf. Marcello v. Bonds,
349 U.S. 302, 309-10 (1955) (the particular provisions of the Immigration Act supersede the more
general provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act on which they were modelled), immigra-
tion judges serve under statutes and well-established rules and administrative arrangements which
provide equivalent safeguards against political oversight; their decisions are required to be taken
"only upon a record." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982); IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIORA-
TION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.7 (1982); 2 Id § 8.12(b) (1983).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982). The section provides:
the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence...-
(1) [when the alien is deportable for reasons not listed in (2) and has been physically
present in the United States for seven years] and proves that during all of such period he
was and is a person of good moral character, and is a person whose deportation would,
in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence; or
(2) [when the alien is deportable for reasons relating to criminal or subversive activity
and has been physically present in the United States for ten years since the commission
of such acts] and proves that during all of such period he has been and is a person of
good moral character, and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to
[Vol. 1983:789
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finding, but under that section the immigration judge's conclusion that
they are present does not end matters. I Reflecting the prior practice of
granting all such relief through private bills, the statute provides that
any finding favoring suspension must be transmitted to Congress, and
takes effect only if neither House repudiates it by resolution during the
following two sessions.12 In Mr. Chadha's case, the House of Repre-
sentatives voted such a resolution at the last moment, without printed
text, debate, or significant explanation. The ostensible purpose of the
resolution was to restore the effectiveness of the order of deportation
previously entered against him and five other immigrants. After sur-
mounting a number of procedural obstacles not important to this tale,
Mr. Chadha's claim to a constitutional right not to be deported in this
manner reached the Supreme Court. The principal argument there con-
cerned the validity of the "legislative veto," which might best be de-
scribed as the condition Congress had attached in conferring on
immigration judges the authority to suspend deportations-that the
suspension would not become final if, during a limited time, it was dis-
approved by a simple resolution of either house.13
Seven Justices, in two opinions, agreed that the legislative veto was
unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger, for himself and five others,
wrote a sweeping indictment of legislative vetoes; Justice Powell con-
curred, although he would have decided the case on narrower grounds
applicable principally to the immigration statute. Justice White, in dis-
sent, vigorously objected to the breadth of the majority's approach, and
concluded that section 244 met constitutional standards. Finally, Jus-
tice Rehnquist dissented on the nonconstitutional ground that the
Court could not appropriately sever the provisions authorizing suspen-
sion of deportation from the legislative veto aspect of the statutory
scheme; accordingly, even if Mr. Chadha were right about the legisla-
tive veto, the relief provisions must also fall and Mr. Chadha thus
could not gain from the outcome.
his spouse, parent or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
11. A finding that they are absent is subject to judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1982).
13. As in so many legal matters, how one characterizes the legislative scheme under discus-
sion tends to ordain the results reached. The Chief Justice's majority opinion treats the immigra-
tion law judge's action and the House resolution as distinct legal acts -as/' the suspension were
a final act, then reversed by the resolution. Justice Whites dissent takes a more integrated view:
the suspension is conditional, and cannot be regarded apart from the possibility of legislative
oversight. Neither characterization is obviously "right"; in a process that prides itself on rational-
ity, the reasoning ought to display consciousness of this fact, and to include an effort to explain the
outcome on other grounds.
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II. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Chief Justice's opinion for the majority turns on a characteri-
zation of the House resolution as a "legislative action" subject to the
formal requirements of article I of the Constitution. The formal re-
quirements, set out in some detail in the text of the opinion,1 4 are not
controversial: legislation is to be enacted by the House and Senate act-
ing in concert; and "every" such exercise of their legislative powers
must culminate in the presentment of the enacted matter to the Presi-
dent for his possible veto.' 5 No one doubts that these requirements
must be met before Congress can adopt some new statement of affirma-
tive principle as law, binding upon the citizenry or government. The
action at issue in this case, however, was at least arguably different: a
standardless, contentless expression of disapproval of executive action,
taken under circumstances that permitted neither the possibility of ex-
pressing more than a simple negative nor any impact beyond the reso-
lution's fact-specific effect on Mr. Chadha's existing deportation order.
The problem for the Court was whether the formalities of legislation
properly apply to such an action.
Although noting that "[niot every action taken by either House is
subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements,"' 6 the
Chief Justice essentially overcomes this problem by assertion. The
question, he says, is whether the action "is properly to be regarded as
legislative in its character and effect."1 7 That question, in turn, appar-
ently depends on the identity of the actor and whether the actor meant
its actions to have force. Because, under the statute, the House action
operates to defeat the executive's conditional authority to suspend Mr.
Chadha's deportation, it "had the purpose and effect of altering the
legal rights, duties and relations of persons. . . outside the legislative
14. 103 S. Ct. at 2780-84. The framers were much less careful in defining the manner in
which the President or the Supreme Court would exercise the power vested in them, a difference
readily taken as an indication of the extent to which they feared legislative hegemony. Cf. G.
WILLS, EXPLAmwnr AMERICA 128-29 (1981) (the structure of the Constitution, placing the legisla-
ture before the executive and judiciary, reflects a hierarchy consistent with legislative supremacy),
15. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 1, 7. Justice White concurred in the lengthy portion of the
majority opinion that describes, in general terms, the history and power-dispersing purposes of
these formal requirements of presentment and bicameralism. See 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White. J.,
dissenting). These purposes include: providing the President with a means of self-defense against
a runaway Congress (and through the President, providing the people with a protection against
the tyranny to be expected if any one branch of government should achieve hegemony); providing
checks against the enactment of improvident or ill-considered measures; and providing for a legis-
lative process that would produce distilled visions of the national good. 103 S. Ct. at 2782-84.
16. Id at 2784.
17. Id (citing S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)).
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branch;"18 that purpose and effect, according to the majority of the
Court, in itself establishes the action's legislative character.
This "altering.. .legal rights" inquiry presents numerous diffi-
culties. It is no measure of legislative activity in the functional sense.
Judicial activity also "alter[s]. . .legal rights, duties and relations of
persons... outside the... branch." Executive activity also has this
effect, at least if rulemaking and administrative adjudication by the ex-
ecutive departments may still be authorized. An exercise of the author-
ity of government is not, ipso facto, an exercise of the particular slice of
that authority central to the acting branch; although Article III courts
act judicially in a formal sense when they adopt rules of procedure or
naturalize a citizen (that is, they are judges acting), they are not thereby
adjudicating a case or controversy, performing the central judicial
function employing prototypical judicial procedures. The functional
requirements are central for Congress as well. Even when it acts bi-
camerally and with presentment, Congress will not be permitted to act
in ways that alter legal rights if a court finds Congress' actions not to be
legislative in character.' 9 Indeed, the House has unquestioned author-
ity to act in some ways that alter legal rights and duties of persons
outside the branch, without resorting to bicameral action or requiring
presentation to the President. In both the investigation of possible fu-
ture legislation and the exercise of oversight functions, the House has
authority to command the presence of witnesses, official and unofficial,
and to attach consequences to their failure to cooperate. 20 Where stat-
18. Id at 2784.
19. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-46 (1965) (framers of the Constitution
adopted the bills of attainder clause to prevent the legislature from overstepping the bounds of its
authority by performing the functions of other departments); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 111-12 (1959) ("Since Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may poten-
tially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive prov-
ince of one of the other branches of the Government."); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315
(1946)("[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial tra are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution."); cf. Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,471 ("[The bill of attainder clause does not) limit Congress to the choice
of legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all."): Ely, Legisia-
live andAdministraive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205, 1308-12 (1970) (dis-
cussing scope of Congress' investigative authority).
20. To be sure, judicial enforcement is customarily provided, but only as a matter of conven-
ience rather than constitutional necessity. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227-28
(1821). In any event, the judicial inquiry is not denovo; in contrast to the enforcement of subpoe-
nas for executive agencies, a court enforcing a congressional finding of contempt reviews a deter-
mination that an offense has already been committed. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 116 (1959); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927); 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1982). The
result of judicial enforcement is a penalty, not a further opportunity to comply; thus, the legal
obligation is mature when Congress acts.
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utes have previously so authorized, the request of a committee, al-
.though less than the full House, imposes a legal obligation on agencies
to conduct investigations,2' or to cooperate with an investigation by
congressional functionaries, 22 a mechanism not readily distinguished
from the legislative veto on the formal grounds the Court chose. None
of these investigatory powers are addressed in the Constitution. In this
respect, the argument that "when the Framers intended to authorize
either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bi-
cameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the proce-
dure for such action,"23 is insufficient.24 Finally, and most importantly,
to characterize what the House did in Mr. Chadha's case as "altering
• . . legal rights" begs the question. Under the statutory scheme as
Congress enacted it, Mr. Chadha's technical right to remain in the
country could not be conferred by the INS alone; it is conferred only if
the INS acts and then only if neither house of Congress acts. To say that
he has acquired a right which the House is now purporting to take
away is to assert a conclusion, not to support it by reasoning.
The Chadha decision would be less important-as the result in the
case is the right one2--if it did not call into question so much that had
been thought established about the dispersal of governmental author-
ity. The opinion repudiates the now deeply engrained proposition that
Congress' legislative authority may be exercised conditionally; yet that
proposition was the initial engine by which delegation of "legislative
powers" was effected, with the conditions, in this instance, supervised
by the courts.2 The Court recognizes the possible inconsistency when
21. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602. 628 (1935).
22. 31 U.S.C. §§ 712(4), 716(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
23. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
24. The cases supporting congressional investigatory power describe it as a necessary and
inevitable adjunct of the legislative process, see, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S, 135. 174
(1927); the legislative veto, as an oversight technique, may not seem so central. Yet, under the
Constitution, Congress is made the principal judge of what is "necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the gov-
ernment of the Uited States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. 1. § 8.
Absent other factors, that empowerment would seem to extend to the legislative veto as well as to
the issues of investigation. My purpose here is not to suggest that those other factors do not exist:
in many cases they do. But the issue does not seem capable of being settled by simple textual
analysis.
25. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
26. See, eg., J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Con-
gress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body author-
ized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power."); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892) ("in the judgment of the legislative
branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of
our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign govern-
ments, in the interests of their people, to invest the President with large discretion in matters
[Vol. 1983:789
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it worries in a lengthy footnote that its reasoning-might be seen as cast-
ing some doubt on rulemaking or other forms of agency action.27 Al-
though, "to be sure, . . . rulemaking . . . may resemble
'lawmaking,' "2--indeed, the end product of rulemaking resembles
lawmaking far more than did the House Resolution here-the Court
concludes that no such inconsistency is presented. Why? In part the
Court again appears to rely on either simple assertion, or some equiva-
lence between the identity of the House and the character of its action,
when it quotes Justice Black's troubling opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer2 9: " 'The President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.' "30 Of
course, the President and the agencies are lawmakers, in any conven-
tional sense of the term, when they engage in rulemaking pursuant to
constitutional or statutory authorization.31 However one might label
what the Department of Justice and the House did in considering the
cancellation of Mr. Chadha's deportation for compassionate reasons,
the action of each seems to have been of the same nature and to have
had precisely the same kind of legal effect on Mr. Chadha's rights. De-
pending on the characterization employed, one could say either that the
Department effected a suspension of an individual deportation order
which the House cancelled, or that, between the two, the conditions for
cancellation of a deportation order were not met. The Court does not!
adequately explain why one actor is regarded as behaving "legisla-
tively," and the other is not. The Court seems to make the Youngstown
passage mean that the "President does not act legislatively because he
is the chief executive; the House does, because it is part of Congress.
What the President does is ipso facto executive; what Congress does,
legislative."
Whether an action is "legislative in character and effect" might
have been thought a function of its characteristics, rather than the iden-
tity of the actor. This approach would have led the Court to consider
the arguable differences between "legislative" and "adjudicative" ac-
arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations"); The
Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388-89 (1813) (Congress may exercise its power
conditionally).
27. Chad/ha, 103 S. CL at 2785 n.16.
28. id.
29. 343 U.S. 579 (1957).
30. Id at 587, quoted in Chadaa, 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
31. Note the striking insistence on the accuracy of that characterization in Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979), where the Court insists on clear statutory authorization for what
administrative lawyers describe as "legislative rulemaking," that is, rulemaking with statute-like
effect,fjrr because of its clearly legislative character.
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tion. This question has much bedeviled administrative law theorists. 2
Furthermore, it seems to underlie the Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution's prohibitions of inappropriate legislative action-the bills of
attainder and ex post facto clauses.33 From these familiar perspectives,
one generally describes "legislation" in terms of its future effect, its ap-
plication to an indeterminate class, its character as a statement of posi-
tive law intended to govern future proceedings, and the contemplation
that there will be such proceedings for its .application, requiring the
application of judgment. "Adjudication," in contrast, is characterized
by its impact on events already transpired, its immediate application to
named parties before the tribunal, and the subordinate (in relative
terms) character of the lawmaking function. The distinction is, to be
sure, imperfect; legislatures have long granted boons to particular indi-
viduals, and the restrictions on their inflicting particularized harms for
past (mis)conduct are uncertain of application.34 Whether the prospec-
tive, lawmaking function of courts is merely an accident of their au-
thority to decide or rather a fundamental aspect of their function is,
increasingly, a matter in dispute.35 Yet, had the Court taken this tack,
it would have found it difficult to describe the House Resolution that
affected Mr. Chadha as properly "legislative." The Resolution applies
only to named persons, on the basis of determinations made by the
House about facts already fixed; it creates no general principle for fu-
ture application, and the proceeding envisioned is one in which only
ministerial tasks are to be performed. Indeed, the majority noted, but
declined to decide, a question whether an order to deport Mr. Chadha
enacted by both houses and signed by the President--thus fulfilling all
the formal requisites of legislation-would have been proper, for just
this reason.36
32. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:2 (2d ed. 1979).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9; see supra note 19.
34. Compare New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976)(city ordinance grandfathering
two established pushcart vendors over all competitors upheld against equal protection challenge)
with United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965) (disqualification of identified group from
union office is bill of attainder);see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468-
84 (1977).
35. Compare P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
FEDERAL COURTSAND FEDERAL JURISDICTION 81 (2d ed. 1973) with Fiss, Foreword- The Forms
ofJusice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979). .
36. Chadia, 103 S. Ct. at 2776 n.8, 2785 n.17. This was the basis of Justice Powell's concur-
rence. That Congress grants relief to individuals through private bills hardly establishes the ap-
propriateness of its determining whether an individual now in line for some administrative relief
ought to be denied that relief in light of his conduct or situation; the bills of attainder clause might
prohibit this mode of action. But cf. Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982) (statute
forbidding further stays of deportation for alleged Nazi war criminals is neither bill of attainder
nor ex post facto legislation; deportation is not punishment and grounds for it may be retroac-
[Vol. 1983:789
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The Court also gives a reason with some functional bite for its
want of concern with rulemaking: the Department's actions are au-
thorized, and consequently limited, by a statute; that fact, with the at-
tendant processes of judicial review, makes the bicameral and
presentment processes unnecessary as a check.37 But this, too, may
prove too much. The House's action was also authorized and limited
by a statute, could occur only within its terms, and no doubt was sub-
ject to judicial correction if these terms were exceeded.38 That the
House's judgment within those bounds did not have to be explained and
was not open to review suggests other bases on which the statutory
mechanism could be questioned. In addition to the attainder questions
already suggested, the Court has strongly hinted that the absence of
judicial control or other participatory procedures to protect one whose
interests are at risk raises constitutional questions, especially when in-
dividual liberty in its most elementary sense is at stake.39 Yet it is hard
to understand how these difficulties turn the House's exercise of its very
limited options into a "legislative" act. One might as well note, as the
Court did,40 that the judgment suspending Mr. Chadha's deportation
order was equally free of the possibility of review (unless in Congress,
pursuant to the act), even if entered in an entirely unauthorized man-
ner.41 But the Court did not for that reason find it to be legislative.42
tively established; significant procedural protections are required, however, in administrative pro-
cess for deciding whether an individual is in the described group).
37. See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
38. If, for example, the House had sought to act after the statutory time had expired, or to
attach a condition to Mr. Chadha's right to remain in the country, it seems clear that habeas
corpus would have relieved him of any deportation order and established his right to permanent
residence.
39. See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16; Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2870 n.23 (1982); 4f. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 329 (1983)
(resident alien temporarily outside the United States entitled to due process protections).
40. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2787 n.21. Curiously, the Court seemed to take reassurance from
the fact that the most lawless of acts by the INS suspending an otherwise valid deportation order
would not be subject to correction in any forum.
41. For example, the agency might act in response to a bribe, or, less dramatically, it might
act without considering one of the required factors or consider an irrelevant one.
42. Doubts expressed by the majority and Justice White as to whether Congress could consti-
tutionally have provided for review, seem misplaced, or at best the product of the particular statu-
tory arrangements chosen in this case. It is, of course, commonplace that a disappointed
intervenor might be able to seek such review (e.g., an environmental organization seeking review
of a decision to authorize construction of a power plant) and where a government agency partici-
pating in the administrative hearing is not identical with the agency that is making the decision,
appeals by the interested agency are not constitutionally problematic. See, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 647
(1954); United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 799-810 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to seek review of adverse determinations on policy issues by the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, an independent agency within his Department. 29 U.S.C.
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Perhaps nowhere in the opinion is the essentially assertive charac-
ter of the majority's analysis clearer than in its final footnote.43 The
footnote seeks to address Justice White's argument in dissent-namely
that, viewed as a whole, the legislative scheme, involving the House,
Senate, and Department of Justice, satisfies all the functional values of
bicameralism and presentment because suspension of the deportation
order cannot occur without the concurrence, in effect, of all three enti-
ties; and that the ability of one house to block suspension by passing a
resolution of disapproval under the current legislation is not different
in any realistic way from the ability of one house to block suspension
under the prior arrangements by refusing to enact -a private bill. The
Court's response is to state that the private bill approach provides "an
opportunity for deliberation and debate. To allow Congress to evade
the strictures of the Constitution and in effect enact Executive propos-
als into law by mere silence cannot be squared with Art. I. ' Because
the recommendation for suspension is presented to both houses, it is
difficult to see how the opportunity for "deliberation and debate" is
any less present than it previously was; if anything, inertia favors the
private person seeking relief from deportation under the present re-
gime, instead of under a regime in which success depends upon having
both houses enact a proffered bill. In terms of enactment "by mere
silence," this mechanism is not readily distinguishable from the mecha-
nism, approved by the Court in Chadha,45 by which such measures as
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are adopted; the Rules lay before
both houses of Congress for a period, and become law unless, within a
stated period, a blocking statute is enacted.-" Indeed, every rulemaking
authorization provides means which "in effect enact Executive propos-
als into law by mere silence," and the Court plainly meant to protect
those authorizations from question. Those rules become "law" in a
§§ 656, 661 (1976). The issue appears to be one strictly ofjural identity, readily manipulated by,
statute, not a constitutional prohibition on government officers seeking judicial review of decisions
favorable to private claims. Indeed, one way of stressing the independence of immigration law
judges within the Department of Justice would have been to make their judgments judicially
reviewable at the Attorney General's behest. It is certainly imaginable that the Attorney General
would disagree with some policy or even factual determination made by such a judge, and the
applicant's assurance of objectivity in the proceedings is precisely that the Attorney General is
afforded no internal, bureaucratic controls over the determination. The result is a situation no
different from what obtains when the government is disappointed in the outcome of a trial. Al-
though government appeals from judgments of acquittal in criminal trials may be constitutionally
objectionable, this is for reasons of fairness, rather than concern for whether there could exist a
"case or controversy."
43. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2787 n.22.
44. Id
45. 103 S. CL at 2776 n.9.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
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sense much more closely statutory than the result of the House's action
in Mr. Chadha's case. The latter creates no deposit on the law, gives no
binding instructions to those who must continue to administer the law;
it governs the individual's case alone. Although that, in itself, may be
the source of objection, it makes speaking of the House's action as "leg-
islative" curious indeed.
Perhaps one should take seriously the notion that whatever is done
by the House or Senate is definitionally legislative, not because of the
characteristics of what is done but because of the identity of the body
acting. The same -propositions would then apply to the President and
the Supreme Court; their actions would, of necessity, be "executive" or
"judicial," respectively. Some suggestion that the Court intends that
approach is found in a repeated "presumption" that a governmental
body is acting within its intended sphere.47 What follows, however, is
that there is then no magic in the word "legislative" to aid in determin-
ing whether the House and/or Senate are acting constitutionally. Be-
cause the House and Senate often act outside the structure of
presentment and bicameralism, and in fact use it only when enacting
laws, one must have reasons not supplied by the label "legislative" for
insisting upon that structure, or for otherwise finding constitutional
fault with the legislative scheme. That observation triggers the kind of
functional inquiry that Justices White and Powell undertook, but the
majority appeared to eschew.48
III. JUSTICE POWELL'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Powell, in his solitary concurrence, sought a less sweeping
means of resolving the case, finding Congress to have "assumed a judi-
cial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers"
when it undertook to review determinations that particular persons are
eligible for suspension of deportation orders. His opinion draws both
on the history of concerns that led to adoption of the bills of attainder
clause and the nature of the decision made, "that six specific persons
did not comply with certain statutory criteria,"4 9 in reaching the con-
47. Chadha, 103 S. CL at 2784.
48. Such an inquiry also seems present in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit's thoughtful opinion in Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir.
1982), which was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). In Con-
suner Energy, the court understood the particular veto as necessarily altering the scope of discre-
tion delegated to an agency, finding this more objectionable because unexplained. 673 F.2d at
465. That characterization has force only if discretion must be structured-that is, where the dele-
gation doctrine would require "law to apply," and not in the predominantly political setting that
characterized early use of the veto. See infra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
49. Chadha. 103 S. Ct. at 2791.
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clusion that the House had here assumed a function of the kind ordina-
rily entrusted to courts or other adjudicatory bodies. To be sure, as
both the majority and Justice White noted, courts do not ordinarily
review agency decisionsfavoring citizens against government, at least
absent a conffict with the claims of other individuals. Putting aside the
question whether such a function could be conferred on federal courts
consistent with the case or controversy requirement, 50 however, the
determinations to be made are nonetheless characteristically judicial.
They involve the determination of historical facts concerning particular
individuals and the application of preexisting policy to those facts.
Such determinations are, as Justice Powell noted, "generally. . .en-
trusted to an impartial tribunal" in our model of government;5' the ab-
sence of the ordinary accoutrements of a hearing in the process that led
to the House resolution underscored the objectionable nature of the
procedure. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, although en-
joying broad discretion in the details of the procedures it employed,
could not make a determination adverse to the interests of a resident
alien free of the constraints of the due process clause applicable to "ad-
judications," as they might be judicially interpreted.52 That the House
could adopt this measure without being subject to checks-whether in-
ternal constraints, procedural safeguards, or the possibility of effective
external review--demonstrated that the dangers feared by the Framers
had matured.5 3
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with Justice Powell's view lies in
Congress' traditional practice of making individual determinations:
through the mechanism of the private bill, whether for the satisfaction
of damage claims against the United States, or the granting of admis-
sion to residence or citizenship. These acts, too, are functionally judi-
cial, in the sense that they apply to particular, named persons, rely on
determinations of individual, often historical facts, establish no general
principle for future application, and foresee no subsequent proceedings
in which their application must be determined. Justice Powell's re-
sponse is to look to the reasons for the restriction: "when the Congress
grants particular individuals relief or benefits under its spending
power, the danger of oppressive action that the separation of powers
was designed to avoid is not implicated. ' 54 It is the denying character-
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.8.
52. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 350-53; cf. Lan-
don v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982); Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982).
53. Justice Powell joined the summary affirmance in United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983), without opinion.
,4. Chadha, 103 S. CL at 2792 n.9.
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istic of the House Resolution in Chadha that brings those restrictions
into play. This response is not wholly satisfactory: the line between
benefit and burden is elusive at the margins; the fact that a benefit has
been conferred may raise questions sounding in equal protection. This
is particularly true where (as often enough occurs in connection with
economic legislation) the conferring of a benefit on one individual or
group cannot easily be separated from the disadvantaging of another,55
and the deportation context, rightly or wrongly, has long been viewed
as involving regulation rather than punishment.5 6 Yet Justice Powell's
distinction corresponds well with core notions of the legislative func-
tion. Congress has in fact regularly rid itself of private bill functions,
including this one. Particularly in light of established practice, the bills
of attainder and ex post facto clauses stand as testimony to the impor-
tance of the distinction.
Justice Powell's argument about appropriate legislative function
ought not to be confused with the separation of powers issues most
commonly raised in recent litigation. In recent cases the issue consid-
ered has been "the extent to which [the challenged legislative arrange-
ments] prevent [some other branch] from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions, ' 57 and whether the complainant,
real or imaginary, has been a member of the offended branch. Justice
Powell does not contend that section 244 infringes judicial power; that
is, he does not assert that it is objectionable for what it does to the
authority of judges, although the other opinions seem so to regard his
claim.5 8 His argument, rather, stresses the unfairness to the claimant,
Mr. Chadha, of having to submit to the possibility of disability result-
ing from a negative congressional judgment about the historical facts of
55. The Supreme Court has occasionally found state economic legislation that favored a
closed class unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 469
(1957); Sf Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring), but has regularly sustained against such challenges statutes conferring monopolies or con-
taining grandfather clauses, perhaps the most common form of such legislation. See Morey, 354
U.S. at 467 n.12; New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976) (overruling Doud in a grandfa-
ther clause context); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977) (bills
of attainder clause not to be interpreted as "a variant of equal protection").
56. The court in Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982), rejected on this basis a
challenge to a statute terminating the Attorney General's authority to suspend deportation of
aliens guilty of Nazi war crimes; the statute evidently applied to past actions of a limited class of
individuals, and so might have seemed fairly open to ex post facto/bills of attainder challenge.
Congress had provided in that statute, however, that the judicial function of determining whether
a given individual was among the described class was to be performed by an administrative of-
ficer, employing significant procedural protections; this feature of the statutory scheme seemed of
singular importance to, and was enforced by, the court.
57. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
58. See 103 S. Ct. at 2787 n.21 (Burger, CJ.); 103 S. Ct. at 2810 (White, J., dissenting).
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his particular case. Justice Powell thus directly invokes the values of
citizen protection against governmental tyranny that underlie both the
separation of powers notion generally and the attainder prohibition in
particular.5 9 Whether the courts' (or the President's) continuing capac-
ity to function is thus impaired-the characteristic focus of recent sepa-
ration of powers inquiries-has at best secondary importance.
IV. JUSTICE WHITE'S DISSENT
Justice White's intellectual approach to the legislative veto ques-
tion, although flawed, seems more consistent with the Court's recent
analyses of separation of powers/checks and balances issues than the
majority's approach. Before the Chief Justice expressed concern in his
opinion about "hydraulic pressures" bursting the boundaries that sepa-
rate the branches of government,6 0 the Court had seemed to be moving
away from the idea of "air-tight" categories and toward a Madisonian
view, stressing function rather than formality. Under the latter view,
the central issues would be the tendency of a challenged device to place
a given branch beyond effective control by others6' or to create an "un-
necessary and dangerous concentration of power in one branch," or to
interfere with a core function of another branch, to a degree unwar-
ranted by "overriding need" to accomplish some other objective.62
59. See Note, 7w Bounds ofLegflative Specfcatioxn A Suggested Approach to the Bl/I o
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L. 330, 343-48 (1962) (John Hart Ely's note discussing separation of
powers and the bill of attainder clause).
60. Chada, 103 S. Ct.at2784.
61. Id at 2786.
62. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 120-23 (1976). The functional approach suggested by the
Court in Buckley was not restricted to application in presidential power cases arising out of the
Nixon presidency, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) ("In designing the structure of our Government and
dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not in-
tended to operate with absolute independence."), but seemed to be paralleled by analytic develop-
ments in other contexts in which the structural constraints of the Constitution were the central
issue. Thus, debate over the tenth amendment, revived by the Court's decision in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), resolved into near unanimity as to the statement of rele-
vant inquiry (if not its application): whether a challenged measure threatens the integrity of the
states in the constitutional scheme. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Ree. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 283-93 (1981). Allocation of authority
between state and nation, like that between executive and legislature. can be understood as a
means of protecting individuals from overwhelming government; deciding what is required to
preserve that protection for citizens, rather than a cataloguing of activities inherent to the states
qua states, has characterized the recent judicial debates. The same may also be suggested for the
public debate--not yet captured in litigation--over whether the Constitution constrains Congress'
authority to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. What would
prevent the judicial branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions is widely
accepted as the appropriate inquiry to be made. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Lini the
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That perspective seems to require, as Justice White argues at length,
that the impact of the legislative veto here be considered for its ten-
dency to rearrange power. In other words, the statutory scheme must
be viewed as a whole.63
For Justice White, the legislative veto "has become a central
means by which Congress secures the accountability of executive and
independent agencies"64-"an important if not indispensable political
intervention that allows the President and Congress to resolve major
constitutional and policy differences, assures the accountability of in-
dependent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress' control over
lawmaking." 65 In light of the relatively limited use of the device to
date, one wonders if he does not overstate the case.66 His judgment is
particularly questionable respecting use of the veto for regulatory over-
sight; at least until recently, enhancing the accountability of independ-
ent regulatory agencies and preserving congressional control over
public rulemaking were not significant uses for the legislative veto, in
either actual or political terms.
A. The Political Uses of Legislative Vetoes.
The political uses of legislative vetoes warrant special analysis.
Justice White's detailed account of the history of the legislative veto
reflects its initial use in reorganization acts, and subsequent expansion
to problems of national security and foreign affairs. In these contexts it
seems proper to characterize the veto, as he does, as a means by which
Congress could "transfer greater authority to the President .. while
preserving its own constitutional role."67 Withdrawals of federal
lands,63 international agreements and tariffs, pay adjustments, war
powers, national emergency legislation, and the impoundment issue
Jurrdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953). But
ef. Wechsler, The Court andthe Constitution, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 1001, 1005 (1965) ("I see no bars
for this view [prohibiting alteration of appellate jurisdiction motivated by hostility to decisions of
the Court] and think it antithetical to the plan of the Constitution for the courts-which was quite
simply that the Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution
should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power.").
63. This is closely related but not identical to the severability question. Although Justice
White agreed with Justice Rehnquist that the congressional review provisions were not properly
severable from the suspension provisions, one could defensibly reach the opposite view as a matter
of statutory interpretation and still conclude that the impact of the veto provision could only be
assessed appropriately by considering the scheme as a whole.
64. Chad/, 103 S. Ct. at 2793.
65. Id at 2795.
66. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
67. Chadha, 103 S. CL at 2793 (emphasis added).
68. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
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each concern chiefly public measures, primarily related to the internal
organization of government and affecting the interests of private per-
sons only indirectly; they reflect areas of direct presidential initiative
and responsibility. In these contexts, too, the veto represents an accom-
modation between the branches, often mutually desired as Justice
White demonstrated, on matters of legitimate interest to each. Reor-
ganization acts, measures concerned with budgetary adjustment (im-
poundment), foreign relations, and war (matters of the character Chief
Justice Marshall long ago referred to as "[q]uestions in their nature
political" 69) rarely appear in a form likely to attract or, more impor-
tantly, to justify judicial review. They may all be described fairly as a,
setting for horse-trading between the President and Congress: the au-
thority subject to the veto will be that of the President himself; no alter-
native means of control is obvious; precise congressional standard-
setting or structural arrangements are probably inadvisable; and a shar-,
ing of political authority is warranted by Congress' legitimate interests
in the subject matter and the consequent desirability of committing
Congress to support of the action to be taken. They evoke Justice Jack-
son's more enduring analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer70 that the power of government is at its peak when the President
and Congress work supportively of each other's authority.71 To the ex-
tent Justice White speaks of the legislative veto in terms of Congres-
sional accommodation directly with a powerful President requiring
more power--as a means of preserving balance while accomplishing
needed delegation to that other potential tyrant---his dissent is
persuasive. 72
69. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
70. 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
71. My colleague Benno Schmidt observes that this alliance between Congress and the Presi-
dent may permit a Congress, spurred perhaps by self-interest in avoiding responsibility for diffi-
cult decisions, excessively to evade its responsibility, as occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, and in effect to confer too much authority on the President. Professor Schmidt's ob-
servation is not an easy one to answer. "Delegation" may remain a viable issue, even in the
political arena, for issues of the largest moment. Cf infra note 79. For the settings that chiefly
concern me, where the President and Congress must deal continuously with each other on a series
of matters of middling importance, that problem--certainly not one that appeared to concern the
Court-is not presented.
72. In a detailed review of the history of political dispute over the legislative veto issue,
Justice White seeks to show that Presidents have most frequently objected to veto provisions that
empowered mere committees of Congress to act. 103 S. Ct. at 2793 n.5. He does not address these
committee vetoes, but strongly hints he would disapprove. Even for measures characterizable as
committee vetoes, however, it may be possible to suggest similar differentiations. See infra notes
92-102 and accompanying text.
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B. The Regulatory Uses of Legislative Vetoes.
At other points Justice White's dissent is far less persuasive, nota-
bly those bearing on the regulatory context, where it speaks only in
terms of Congress' accomplishment of its own "designated role under
Article I as the nation's lawmaker, ' 73 independent of any relational
concerns. The legislative veto did not begin to appear with any fre-
quency in that context until the 1970's. In that setting, Justice White's
assertion that the legislative veto should be understood as a check on
the President corresponding to the bicameral legislature/presidential
veto regime, one of the principle engines of his analysis, is at best ques-
tionably relevant. The difficulties arise for two reasons: first, ordinarily
the President is not the delegate under these statutes and his authority
to direct the proceedings over which the veto is reserved is, at best,
controversial; second, even if he were the delegate, reservation of an
unconditional congressional negative would not protect Congress'
"designated role . . . as the nation's lawmaker." Illuminating these
difficulties is the burden of the following paragraphs. To observe them
is to suggest a possibility for discrimination among various types of
legislative vetoes that neither Justice White nor the majority seemed to
wish to entertain.
Thus, one premise of Justice White's argument is that, as the Presi-
dent is the source of the action subject to the veto, the effect of the
mechanism is merely to invert the ordinary processes of legislative ac-
tion; the agreement of all three actors is in any event required, and in
that way the essentials of the constitutional scheme are preserved. That
premise will not always be true; some proposals subject to legislative
vetoes come from the President, but others come from rulemakers not
subject to direct presidential control or, as here, administrative judges
acting "on the record," 74 and thus also not subject to presidential direc-
tion. In particular, congressional delegations of regulatory authority
are most often made not to the President, but to some agency or official
-L-whether executive branch or independent regulatory commission.75
73. Chadha, 103 S. CL at 2795-96.
74. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
75. Justice White draws no distinction between independent regulatory commissions and ex-
ecutive branch agencies; indeed, at points he goes out of his way to suggest legislative vetoes are
especially important for the former, because they are not subject to presidential supervisory con-
trol. His dissents from the Court's summary affirmances in the two regulatory cases, see supra
note I. underscore this proposition.
This aspect of his position has its roots in his separate opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 284-85 & n.30 (1976). The majority opinion in that case had placed within the reach of the
appointments clause in article II of the Constitution any officer of government administering the
laws of the United States in relation to its citizens-independent regulatory commissions along
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The legal authority to act is then that of the delegate, and even for
indisputably executive agencies the President's power of direction ap-
pears limited in ways that make it difficult to characterize him as the
delegate.76 It is, then, a question, rather than a matter for easy asser-
tion, whether a provision for legislative veto of proposed agency action
merely rearranges the preexisting authority of the three political
branches while preserving the checks each is intended to possess
against the actions of the others. The more difficult Congress makes it,
in its original delegation, for the President to participate and instruct,
the greater the reason to suspect that the legislative veto does in fact
operate as a device for evasion of the President's participation in gov-
ernance rather than the simple redressing of an imbalance created by
the practical need to delegate.
The second difficulty with the "functional equivalency" argument
in the regulatory context is that presidential (or agency) shaping of
rules followed by an up-or-down congressional "veto" is not the
equivalent of the Article I legislative process. The possibility that any
one of the three political arms of government can prevent the enact-
ment of legislation is only part of the constitutional scheme. Of at least
equal significance is that, where legislation is to be created, the oppor-
tunities for shaping and constructive change are to be focused in two of
them, the House and the Senate. Congress does not act as a lawmaker
when it leaves to other entities all possibility of shaping and accommo-
dating that go into the drafting of a rule, reserving for itself only the
possibility of an unconditional negative;77 it then serves the same func-
tion as the President does respecting the legislation Congress does en-
with what are more traditionally regarded as executive branch agencies -thus resurrecting the
question to what extent or in what circumstances the President can be excluded. See Nathanson,
Separation of Powers andAdministrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independ.
ent"Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1064 (1981); Strauss, Separation ofPowers andthe Fourth Branch"
The Place of Agencies in Government (forthcoming). One would think the arguments supporting
the veto are much weaker in circumstances in which the proposal subject to it can no longer fairly
be characterized as the President's, and indeed the suggestion can be made that Congress has
found a way around the President's own participation in the legislative process and the constitu-
tional requirement of a unitary executive.
76. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974) (departmental regulation freed
special prosecutor from direction by President in prosecutorial choices, a quintessentially execu-
tive activity); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussion of Presi-
dent's involvement in rulemaking). In this case, in particular, Mr. Chadha would doubtless have
had a telling complaint if the President had called the Attorney General on the telephone and
instructed him to tell the sitting immigration law judge that Chadha's deportation order was not to
be suspended, because the President had concluded that the statutory criteria were not met; the
governing statute requires that judgment be made "on the record." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982); see
=spra note 9.
77. See Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE LJ. 619, 629.
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act. The drafters of the Constitution meant the shaping of legislation to
be done by Congress; and that adjustment seems important to the over-
all scheme. Unlike the political contexts in which legislative vetoes
were first developed, agency rulemaking results in what are unmistaka-
bly laws unmistakably constraining the conduct of persons outside
government.
To be sure, the constitutional design has suffered considerable ero-
sion. Even absent the legislative veto, Congress' work has frequently
been wanting. We permit Congress to delegate notably open-ended
rulemaking authority to agencies, subject only to the now limited con-
straints of the delegation doctrine: that the authority has been clearly
delegated;78 and that the authority be described with clarity sufficient
to permit a court to assess whether it has been exceeded. Even so, and
.putting aside the question whether the courts are not now, and prop-
erly, reinvigorating these controls, use of the legislative veto to control
agency rulemaking--the generation of statute-like prescriptions bind-
ing upon the citizenry-aggravates the delegation problem rather than
ameliorates it. Congress may have been encouraged by the availability
of the veto both to employ vague standards of delegation to proxy stat-
ute-shapers, and to respond to its proxies' "excesses" with unexplainedi
ad hoc negatives rather than with the construction of revised statutory
prescriptions.79 For these reasons, the authority of Congress to bestow
rulemaking power on agencies (subject to judicial check) need not be
found to imply authority to reserve a. legislative veto. 0 The latter in-
volves the assertion of a right to act without finality in a manner likely
78. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317-19 (1979).
79. Cf. Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 465-70 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aJ'd, sub
non Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556
(1983) ("[Mhe effect of a congressional veto is to alter the scope of the agency's discretion. In this
case, the practical effect probably was to withdraw the discretion altogether.. . . In other cases,
exercise of the legislative veto may enable one house of Congress effectively to dictate that a
specific type of rule be promulgated."). Tying the analysis to the delegation issue, as the District
of Columbia Circuit suggested but the Court did not, suggests that a different outcome might be
appropriate where "delegation" issues would not ordinarily be thought a concern. Cf. Curran v.
Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 129-31 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (no delegation problem existed where
legislation providing for a reserve fleet committed management of it to agency discretion) where
the court stated:
That the matter before us for consid-ration lies in the special zones of the exceptions,
rather than the ordinary area of judicial reviewability, is established by several cardinal
aspects of the issues. The case involves decisions relating to the conduct of national
defense; the President has a key role; the national interest contemplates and requires
flexibility in management of defense resources; and the particular issues call for determi-
nations that lie outside sound judicial domain in terms of aptitude, facilities and respon-
sibility.... [O]ur decision does not involve personal rights and liberties, does not
involve constitutional claims, and does not involve a right expressly granted by statute
that qualifies what would otherwise be non-reviewable discretion.
80. Chadha, 103 S. CL at 2802.
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to be harmful, not helpful, to Congress' "designated role."81 It evokes
untempered the fears of arbitrary political action by Congress that so
strongly prompted the Framers' efforts to design institutions that would
avoid the threat of legislative tyranny.82 In contrast, a Congress grant-
ing to agencies what, from its perspective, is a final authority to make
rules may be encouraged by that prospect to more precision in stan-
dard-setting. Such precision is desirable both to facilitate judicial re-
view and to protect the citizen against arbitrary action. Additional
protection may be derived if the actual rulemaker is obliged to act on
ostensibly rational, apolitical grounds, freed to some extent from the
directory, political influence of the President or Congress. 3 Room thus
exists at least for suspicion that legislative vetoes will produce less care-
ful initial drafting by providing a mechanism whereby difficult issues
can be cheaply revisited.84 The threat of their exercise may also en-
81. To be sure, the "Lockean principle that the grant of legislative power is one 'only to make
laws, and not to make legislators' has fallen before the inexorable momentum of the administra-
tive state." Monaghan, Marbury and Adminirzradh'e Law, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 25 (1983).
Authority finally conferred may be executed, however, with an assurance and subject to an exter-
nal check that authority granted in conditional form may not. To put the same argument in a
somewhat different way, Congress may be seen more fully to have acted "to make legislators"
when the authority it confers is subject to its own informal controls and, perhaps, removed from
executive controls.
82. 0. WiLLs, EXPLAINING AMERICA 213-14, 260-64 (1981); see Consumer Energy Council v.
FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aed, sub non. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
83. The "to some extent" is advertent; judge-like insulation of the rulemaker would be inap-
propriate. Rulemaking, in my view, properly continues to be performed "off the record," in a
technical sense; its very focus on policy-making warrants provision for political oversight in some
form, see Strauss, Dirqalfcation of Deci.rional Officas in Rulemaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 990,
995 (1980), albeit subject to what might be described as Marquis of Queensbury rules. Cf District
of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Assn's v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (rulemaker's
decision would be invalid if based in whole or in part on pressures emanating from certain Con-
gressmen) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972). For policy-making intended to influence planning
choices (major purchases and other compliance activities by the public at large), the alternative of
remitting all control to the random, episodic, party-distorted, and necessarily long delayed world
ofjudicial review is unsustainable. One might note in this respect the constitutional responsibility
for oversight inherent in the President's authority to demand "the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of
their respective Offices," U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cLI, as well as Congress' yearly, and intended,
control over agency priorities through the appropriations process.
84. The legislative veto provision at issue in Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d
425, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1982), afd sub nom Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy
Council of America, 103 S. CL 3556 (1983), is a case in point. The Federal Energy Regulation
Commission (FERC) had adopted a rule, with high financial consequences for the energy indus-
try, in compliance with a directive in President Carter's energy legislation. The reservation of a
legislative veto substantially resulted from the fact that the legislation had been highly controver-
sial and difficult to pass and because authorization of this particular rulemaking had been espe-
cially controversial, When the rule was adopted by FERC and forwarded to Congress for its
consideration of the legislative veto issue, no substantial discussion of the compliance of FERC
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hance the aggressiveness of political oversight by congressmen or con-
gressional committees. In sum, the existence of a legislative veto in a
regulatory statute may look much more like political self-aggrandize-
ment than "a means of defense"8 5 against the Imperial Presidency.8 6
The record of the exercise of legislative vetoes in the regulatory context,
although infrequent, is not reassuring, either as to its impact on Con-
gress' primary function of legislating or as to its use as a means of polit-
ical accommodation.87
Both these difficulties with the "functional equivalency" argument
might also be raised with respect to three devices which the majority
did not seem to intend to call into question: the lay-before technique
for rulemaking, by which the judiciary's own procedural rulemaking is
accomplished, in which proposed rules are laid before Congress and
become effective only if not disapproved by statute within a stated pe-
riod; congressional use of appropriations lines, essentially insulated
from presidential disapproval by his inability to effect an item veto, to
control particular agency endeavors; and congressional delegation of
rulemaking authority to a body, such as an independent regulatory
commission, ostensibly placed beyond the President's usual executive
branch oversight. Each of these devices may effectively defeat present-
ment of the agency's development of law while maintaining substantial
congressional controls. In this way, each might be characterized as an
end run around the President's veto power. At least the first two also
seem to provide Congress with an effective technique by which to es-
cape any need for statutory precision. Congress remains able to enact
vague standards subject to its own subsequent, ad hoc correction.
These are troublesome observations, but the result may be to call into
question these techniques as well. 88 Short of that, one may remark
that, unlike the legislative veto, each device contains significant self-
corrective or limiting factors. Lay-before statutes require Congress to
surrender substantially greater control than the legislative veto and to
that extent encourage initial drafting precision. In creating independ-
ent agencies, Congress also relinquishes substantially more control
with the statute, or of the justification for the rule under the statute, occurred. Instead, the House
exercised its veto because it was convinced that the original statutory authorization for rulemaking
had been in error and that the program FERC was implementing, entirely faithfully so far as
anyone was concerned, ought never to have been adopted.
85. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Understandably, Justice Whites history of presidential bargaining for legislative vetoes
in return for accretions to the President's own power has no application in this context.
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. See Strauss, Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branck The Place ofAgencies in Gover-
ment (forthcoming).
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than it could retain with the legislative veto. Finally, appropriations
measures are episodic, politically linked with other matters, and impre-
cise in their impact. More generally, to uphold any of these devices it
need not be conceded that Congress can validly exclude the President
from political oversight of activities for which Congress maintains its
own political connections.
V. PRESERVING THE POLITICAL VETO
This consideration of the "functional equivalency" argument sug-
gests a broad distinction between use of the legislative veto as a check
on the chief executive, and use of the legislative veto as a check on any
agency to which power has been delegated. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, in a pair of recent decisions,8 9 drew just such a distinction. It
struck down a provision for general legislative veto of proposed agency
rules, while upholding a specific provision establishing legislative veto
procedures for projects proposed by the state's building authority that
would require long-term leases by state agencies. In the former setting,
the court thought the legislative veto threatened both to impair the bal-
ance of power within state government and to diminish the quality of
initial legislative efforts.90 The latter measure concerned essentially
political accommodations, with no diminution of gubernatorial control;
the legislature's opportunity to disapprove a proposal could be thought
of as creating a form of moral obligation to make the future appropria-
tions meet the proposal's terms.91 In this respect, the New Jersey court
evidently believed that the opportunity for a legislative veto was not
merely unobjectionable, but in fact served a positive function in the
arrangements of state government.
A recent panel opinion in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, American Federation of Government
Employees v. Pierce,92 may suggest the difficulties in failing to make
such distinctions. The case involved an annual appropriations bill for
the Department of Housing and Urban Development which had pro-
vided, in part, that none of the funds it made available "may be used
prior to January 1, 1983, to plan, design, implement, or administer any,
reorganization of the Department without the prior approval of the
89. General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 NJ. 376, 379, 448 A.2d 438, 439 (1982); Enourato v. NJ.
Building Authority, 90 NJ. 396, 401-02, 448 A.2d 449, 451-52 (1982).
90. B.rne, 90 NJ. at 395-96, 448 A.2d at 448-49.
91. Enourato, 90 NJ. at 401, 405, 448 A.2d at 451, 453.
92. 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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Committees on Appropriations. '93 Provisos such as these are neither
uncommon, nor counted in totaling up the number of legislative veto
provisions or the frequency of their exercise. Presumably the Congress
enacting such a proviso is not yet prepared to appropriate funds for the
stated purpose, and the measure reflects a compromise with an execu-
tive seeking added flexibility that Congress is not required to afford.
Even without such provisos, it is commonplace for an agency subjected
to a line-item budget, and uncertain about its authority or wishing to
reallocate its funds, to call the relevant appropriations committee and
explain its plan; with committee approval, or perhaps absent objection,
the changed expenditures can be made within the limits established by
the overall appropriation. The enforcement of budgetary limitations is
almost wholly internal to the political branches of government, and a
matter of intense and appropriate congressional interest. Judicial con-
trols could be invoked only with great difficulty94 and the provisions
rarely if ever implicate private claims of right. So long as the line-item
budget is employed-and it is hard to construct either the argument
that Congress must enact an aggregate budget for each agency or the
belief that, as a political matter, it soon will 95-it is useful to both sides
to have an informal technique for adjustments of expenditure within
the overall aggregate appropriation to a given agency.
The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion, rendered prior to
Chadha, finds the proviso offensive, both as a departure from the bi-
cameral-presentment requirements of "legislative action" and as a
"means for Congress to control the executive without going through the
full lawmaking process, thus unconstitutionally enhancing congres-
93. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriation
Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-272, 96 Stat. 1160, 1164 (1982).
94. In most circumstances, the interest involved in enforcing a required limitation on expend-
itures of governmental funds would be a "generalized grievance" about governmental adherence
to law insufficient to sustain constitutional standing. In American Fed'n of Gov'I Employees, 697
F.2d at 305, however, the court held that only a member of the House of Representatives Appro-
priations Committee had a sufficient personal stake and then only because of its relationship to the
Committee's authority.
95. Indeed, it seems likely that Congress will learn to substitute appropriations controls for
the legislative veto; the Chadha court was quite explicit in reaffirming the continuing power of the
purse. Those who drafted the Constitution believed that ultimate control inevitably lay with Con-
gress because it possessed the power of the purse. See, e.g., THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 522-23 (A.
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); cf G. WILLS, supra note 82, at 128, 135 (Congress is given what
might be called "shoot-out" power, the weapons for a final showdown with both other branches.).
In this respect, those who see in the legislative veto decisions added power for the executive in its
relations with Congress seem. certain to be disappointed; and that will likely be more, rather than
less, the case if the appropriations authority cannot itself be rendered flexible by mechanisms like
committee approvals.
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sional power at the expense of executive power." 96 Nothing in Chadha
suggests a need to reconsider this judgment. Yet, if one considers the
budgetary process as a whole, neither of these characterizations is, or at
least need be,97 apt. Appropriations measures originate with the Presi-
dent and must be signed by him; his Office of Management and
Budget, with but few exceptions, controls both the initial submissions
and requested alterations. Housing and Urban Development Secretary
Pierce is unlikely to have taken the steps that brought about the lawsuit
inAmerican Federation of Government Employees without the initial as-
surance of presidential backing, as he would not have sought commit-
tee approval for the otherwise forbidden expenditures without that
assurance.98 The limited duration of appropriations measures and the
practical difficulty the President in any event faces in exercising his
veto authority over such measures also suggest a presentment issue far
less substantial than that involved when an agency is authorized, for an
indefinite term and without presidential participation, to adopt rules as
binding as statutes on the public at large, rules which are then made the
subject of legislative veto procedures.
Similarly, viewing such practices as means for enhancing congres-
sional control over the executive without use of the full legislative pro-
96. American Fed'n of Gov'L Employees, 697 F.2d at 306.
97. Imagine a situation in which an independent regulatory commission has secured "condi-
tional" authority to spend, albeit with the post-appropriations approval of its appropriations com-
mittee, sums which the President did not request. The President has had the chance to approve
the condition, as he could have had an unconditional appropriation for this unwanted expendi-
ture; absent the possibility of a line-item veto, either is at best a crude instrument of control.
Perhaps it could be argued in such a case that Congress had evaded the functional equivalent
of presentment inherent in the presidential budget process and the presidential Office of Manage-
ment and Budget's controls over agency budget proposals and requests for funding. Or, at some
point, the very thickness of a forest of conditional appropriations might persuade one that Con-
gress had passed over from enhancing executive flexibility at the price of congressional participa-
tion, to attempting to seize the reins of control more firmly than the appropriations authority
already envisages. The distinction here might not be unlike that that permits the courts to swallow
most delegations, but caused them to pause before the sweeping empowerment of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933), see Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539-42 (1935); or that permits substantial federal regulation of state
concerns, but not to the point of extinguishing state control of essential functions. See supra note
62.
98. The case arose out of an alleged disobedience of the statutory provision, when the Secre-
tary announced a reduction in force in the Department, effective before January 1, 1983, and
apparently signaled that funds had been expended to design and implement a departmental reor-
ganization; the only plaintiff found to have standing to sue was a member of the House Appropri-
ations Committee asserting that his statutory claim to approval had been defeated, and he was
then met with a determination that that claim was unconstitutional. See American Fed'n of Gov i
Employees, 697 F.2d at 305-06.
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cess, 99 and hence violative of separation of powers, is questionable on
these facts and, in addition, apparently insufficient. The full legislative
process is used at least annually; although the "one bite at the apple"
theory invoked by Justice White in general defense of the legislative
veto raises problems when applied to measures of indefinite duration
and broad authority, it seems less problematic in the budgetary context.
The District of Columbia Circuit panel's characterization of such
measures as involving "enhanced contror' rather than "enhanced flex-
ibility," "enhanced precision," or "enhanced executive authority"
seems at the least to depend on a careful understanding of the particu-
lar context in which control will be exercised. It seems doubtful that
Congress would be willing to make the questioned appropriation ab-
sent some technique for later assuring itself, or its trusted agents, that
an appropriation that now seems unjustified has in fact become war-
ranted by intervening events. If that is so, it is hard to treat these meas-
ures as if only Congress gains in power and the President necessarily
loses. As already noted, t°° the Court's recent separation of powers
cases make threat to core function, not marginal enhancement of polit-
ical clout in a necessarily fluid relationship, central in any event. Even
if such measures enhanced Congress' control, it is impossible to make
that assessment-unless one can show (as was not urged here) a general-
ity of use and impact. As Judges Wald and Mikva suggested in the
course of explaining, sua sponte, their unavailing wish to set the case
for argument en banc, the government gains in flexibility when ar-
rangements such as these can be made.101 Indeed it is difficult to un-
derstand how these arrangements present the risks of one-branch or
even one-house hegemony, of government out of control, that initially
produced the allocation of governmental authority that characterizes
our Constitution.
99. It might be remarked that use of hearings and other oversight measures are also means
for enhancing congressional control over the executive without use of the full legislative process,
although in this instance the obligation of the executive to respond is marked by political expedi-
ency rather than legal constraints. I do not mean to ignore that difference. Yet one must avoid the
attitude, which might be taken from the Court's opinion, that congressional controls over execu-
tive agencies are undesirable-that it suffices to leave all control in the hands of the courts. Put-
ting aside that any such proposition is infected with a disqualifying degree of self-interest in the
courts, judicial controls are simply incapable of providing timely oversight or invoking political
responsibility in the exercise of discretion within the law. Cf. Sierra Club. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,
410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Cases like this highlight the critical responsibilities Congress has entrusted
to the courts in proceedings of such length, complexity and disorder."). The expectation, indeed
the purpose of those who drafted the Constitution was to assure that the political branches con-
stanty checked one another, that there may be excesses in the process that threaten to undo the
balance the Constitution sought is not to be mistaken for disapproval of the continuing struggle.
100. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
101. American Fed'n of Go't Employees, 697 F.2d at 308-09.
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With two exceptions, measures such as these seem precisely paral-
lel to the earliest delegation cases, cases in which Congress set tariff
levels and then permitted the President to vary them if he found that
specified conditions had been met. Those legislative actions were up-
held despite their conditional character. The two exceptions are, first,
that Congress did not set forth standards for the congressional commit-
tees' exercise of the releasing authority that it granted; and, second, that
a part of the legislature, rather than the executive, determined whether
or not the conditions had been met. If the lack of adequate standards
threatened public interests as, for example, it seems to do for legislative
vetoes of agency rulemaking,' 02 that would provide a basis for distinc-
tion. "Delegation" has continued bite in that context. But an excep-,
tional measure for freeing the executive branch to spend funds within
general appropriation limits for purposes not otherwise authorized is
hard to characterize as presenting such a threat to thepublic; its internal,
implications, as already suggested, are at the least a function of context.
That a congressional committee, rather than the President or some
agency, determines whether the conditions have been satisfied, simi-
larly, seems important for some contexts but unexceptionable in the
world of continuing executive-legislative interaction that characterizes
the budget process. In such a continuing relationship, limiting one par-
ticipant to episodic, formal, even clumsy acts is likely to produce rigid-
ity and a covetousness about power that will hamper the effective,
conduct of government and may weaken the presidency far more than
the alternative. The same is true for reorganization acts; in a govern-
ment premised on the selection of a single executive as its head, it is
internally sensible and externally non-threatening for the President to
be the prime shaper of the internal structures of government, subject to
congressional disapproval.
Obviously, there could be disagreements about particular meas-
ures, but the general utility of the New Jersey court's approach seems
evident. One wishes the Court had limited itself to the particular meas-
ures before it, or that it or Justice White had shown some sensitivity in
addressing the variety of settings in which legislative vetoes might be
employed. In the three cases it had to decide, the Court reached a
sound result: Congress has no business determining that the individual
circumstances of a particular alien warrant his deportation; and in the
regulatory rulemaking context, especially as it concerns the independ-
ent regulatory commissions, the legislative veto does seem to exclude
the President rather than mediate a continuing dialogue between the
102. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
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President and the Congress. Yet for the cases it did not have to decide,
but seemed to Justice White's premises seem stronger than the
majority's. 0 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The argument that a legislative veto can be the functional
equivalent of "normal" constitutional processes-or, perhaps more
properly, works no threatening rearrangement of initiative and author-
ity-is persuasive for the settings in which the device was earliest and
most commonly used:
- where the President himself takes or directs the action subject to
the legislative veto;
- where the subject matter principally concerns the internal ar-
rangements of government rather than rules of conduct applicable to
the public, and judicial consideration at any stage is unlikely;
- where both the President and Congress have an important in-
terest in the subject matter of the action to be taken, and congressional
participation through the veto may prompt less grudging recognition of
the President's participation and/or a sense of moral commitment to
provide fiscal or other support for the resulting arrangements.
The argument is far less persuasive, however, in the regulatory set-
ting, where, on the other hand:
- the President ordinarily is not a direct participant, and may
even be excluded from direct participation;
-judgments affecting individual interests or obligations are to be
made, and judicial review of agency action is readily available;
- permitting use of the legislative veto may tempt Congress to
believe that it can easily correct the excesses of a careless formula gov-
erning the obligations of the public, and correct them without the need
to articulate a fresh or limiting principle; and
- the justification offered for use of the veto is framed not in
terms of political accommodation between a Congress and President,
103. It is disappointing that, while Justice White deplores the majority's failure to find a mid-
dle ground and makes several intriguing suggestions for future development, he himself takes an
apparently uncompromising position. Perhaps Justice White's most intriguing suggestion is for a
statutory direction to courts to regard legislative resolutions of disapproval as relevant legislative
history. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2796 n. 11. The new Model State Administrative Procedure Act
embodies a provision of this character as a substitute for legislative veto; adoption of the legisla-
tive resolution deprives the agency action of any presumption of validity, requiring the agency
affirmatively to demonstrate its authority for the measure adopted. See MoDEL STATE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT §§ 3-203, 3-204 and Commissioner's Comments, 14 U.L.A. 97-101
(Supp. 1983).
Vol. 1983:789)
DUKE L4WJOURN4L
both interested in the premises, but only in terms of Congress' perform-
ance of its own legislative function.
Neither the majority opinion nor Justice White's dissent seem to
leave much room for accommodations of this character. Perhaps the
Court's opinion will, over the years, be confined to its facts. In the late
1920's, the Court heard argument and then reargument in a much pub-
licized dispute over the President's right to fire a postmaster without
senatorial approval. A divided Court, in lengthy and seemingly cate-
gorical opinions, upheld the President's authority on sharply stated sep-
aration of powers grounds.) 4 Many sensible arrangements of
government, most notably, the fixed term of office given some officers,
such as regulatory commissioners, seemed to have been called into
question. Ten years had not passed before a unanimous Court easily
found its way to the conclusion that, that decision notwithstanding,
Congress could provide protected terms of office for regulatory com-
missioners. 0 5 One may hope for a similar outcome here.
Looking back at the majority opinion to see how that might be
achieved, one must begin with some pessimism as to whether the op-
portunity will soon arise. As the popular press reported, and Justices
Powell and White decried, the majority seems bent on eliminating the
legislative veto device in all its forms. The formal approach the major-
ity took does not readily yield to the functional distinctions here sug-
gested. t06 The strength of the Court's language will discourage
challenges. Perhaps more important, the political settings for which
use of the legislative veto seems most justified seem also to be the least
likely to produce sustainable litigation. 0 7 Thus, future judicial oppor-
tunities to examine these issues seem likely to be infrequent at best.
104. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
105. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602. 626-30 (1935). Humphreys Exr em-
ployed a highly formalistic analysis, highly misleading in my view and since displaced by the
reasoning in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 118-43 (1976). The result, however, was plainly the right one.
106. Those distinctions do not, in my view, deny meaning to the requirements of bicameralism
and presentment for the enactment of laws. The problem, again, is whether to regard the exercise
of a legislative veto as the enactment of law. The burden of the preceding discussion is that, first,
there is no necessary reason to do so and, second, that there is good reason not to do so. Some
vetoes adequately preserve the President's role while also serving proper congressional interests
and, most importantly, equally serving citizens' interests in enjoying a government of adequate
strength and flexibility which yet tends to be held in check by the natural and continuing competi-
tion for political authority among its parts.
107. Reorganization, the exercise of authorities subject to the War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat.
555, 556-57 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (1976)), impoundment, see, e.g., Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35 (1974) (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 1403 (1976)), and the like will not, in my judgment, often produce justiciable controversies be-
tween parties with standing to seek their resolution. Cf. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Congressman did not have standing as legislator. but
did have standing as member of House Appropriations Committee).
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If opportunities for reconsideration do occur, perhaps the most
likely verbal hook for the accomplishment of modification is to be
found in the majority's stress on "altering legal rights" as the test for
determining whether challenged action is "legislative" or not. For the
reasons already suggested, that inquiry does not make much sense as a
means of determining "legislative" character. If it could be understood
in slightly different terms, however, it could provide the basis for a dis-
tinction like that suggested above. As framed ("altering the legal
rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative
branch") it seems to extend to the political, largely infra-governmental
uses of the legislative veto as well as to those that directly affect citi-
zens. The President is a person, as are the other actors in cabinet de-
partments and government agencies whose "legal rights, duties and
relations" might be affected by legislative veto of a proposed reorgani-
zation or impoundment. It would take rather little readjustment in lan-
guage, however, and perhaps none in meaning, to read the test as
forbidding legislative vetoes only of those sorts of government action
that have as their principal purpose and effect "altering the legal rights,
duties and relations of persons" outside government. The altered test
still could not be viewed as a measure of what is or is not "legislative";
but that is not the issue. The results of such an approach, overall,
would be a far more satisfactory rendering of the conjoined purposes of
governmental flexibility, role dispersal, and citizen protection that
characterize our Constitution.
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